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Abstract
Many observers argue that one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 recession was the abnormal accu-
mulation of risk by banks. This paper provides a signaling explanation for this race for risk. If banks
returns can be observed while risk cannot, the less e¢ cient banks can hide their type by taking more risks
and paying the same returns as the more e¢ cient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even
higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized
by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case.
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1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 recession has been by all dimensions one of the most severe since the Great De-
pression (Brunnermeier, 2009). Social costs were huge, both in terms of output loss and rising
unemployment (IMF, 2010). Fiscal positions of many countries were deeply undermined, with
lasting consequences on growth prospects. While scholars will debate for many years about the
deep causes of the crisis, a majority of experts claim that one essential determining factor was
the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks (inter alia, Borio, 2008; Trichet, 2008; Diamond &
Rajan, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010; Pomfert, 2010). This observation begs the question on why, in the
rst place, did banks engage in what can be described as a genuine race for risk?
The answer submitted in this paper brings into the picture the asymmetric information between
banksshareholders and managers with respect to the structural risk of these nancial institutions.
One key feature of banksactivity is their opacity in functioning and management. As emphasized
by Morgan (2002, p.874) "risks taken into the process of intermediation are hard to observe from
outside the banks". Indeed, banks are traditionally very reluctant to disclose any information
about their clients on both sides of their balance sheets. Furthermore, the composition of their
asset portfolio is both a strategic decision and a key factor of success; no bank will eagerly disclose
this information. Over the last twenty years, the complexity and opacity of banks nancial
intermediation has increased dramatically, being driven essentially by a shift from the traditional
"deposit and loan" model to the "orginate-to-securitize" model (Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Stiglitz,
2010). In theory, securitization should have allowed banks to transfer most of the credit risk to a
myriad of investors; in practice, it turned out that during this crisis US banks kept large amounts
of high risk securities on their books; furthermore, when di¢ culties arose, they had to cover the
risks embedded in o¤-balance sheet entities they had created for securitization purposes. European
banks have also aggressively invested in CDOs with a hidden content in US subprime loans, that
had a true risk known only to a minority of insiders.
In general, given that higher risks command higher returns, banking technology allows the
manager to choose the preferred risk/return combination. As the experience of the 2007-2009
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recession has shown, banks are not equally equipped to face adversity. Newspapers extensively
covered the dramatic situation of failing banks; other banks came out as unchallenged winners
from the restructuring process.1 Actually, banks di¤er in their portfolio of activities, investment
and loan opportunities, risk management systems and operating costs. Empirical literature has
revealed that problem loans and cost e¢ ciency are related measures, with banks approaching
failure featuring both high ratios of problem loans and low cost e¢ ciency (Berger & DeYoung,
1997; DeYoung, 1997). In order to keep the model as simple as possible, in this paper we focus
only on di¤erences in cost e¢ ciency, but the structure of the problem and the conclusions would
not change much if we alternatively consider that less e¢ cient banks have also less investment
opportunities than the more e¢ cient banks.
We assume that there are (only) two types of banks, the high cost-e¢ cient (or "good") ones
and the low cost-e¢ cient (or "bad") ones.2 A caveat is needed here: if a banks spends more
resources monitoring the quality of its portfolio and is quicker to write-down unperforming assets,
then these higher costs would not necessarily be representative of a bad management (Boot &
Marinc, 2006). In our setup, cost e¢ ciency is a basic measure of wasted resources in a static
perspective. Thus, a less e¢ cient bank can deliver the same returns as a highly-e¢ cient bank only
if it takes more risks on its balance sheet. The bank-specic risk/return relationship is introduced
in a very stylized way, inspired by the traditional model by Markovitz (1952). More precisely, the
bank is represented as a portfolio manager, investing shareholders wealth in a convex combination
between the riskless asset and a portfolio of risky assets.
Building on this simplied bank model, we analyze banks risk/return strategies within the
framework of a classical signaling game (Spence, 1973, 2002; Riley, 1975) that opposes banks
managers to shareholders. In a perfect information world, all investors would ee the less e¢ cient
banks to join the most e¢ cient ones, and the former type of bank would be pulled out of the market.
However, if returns can be observed by private investors but risk cannot, then less e¢ cient banks
1 The dramatic fall of Lehman Brothers, or the massive support of the respective governements to rescue
Citigroup, UBS, Royal Bank of Scotland, Northern Rock, Hypo Real Estate or Dexia, etc. can be weighted against
rather successful stories of Barclays, HSBC, Nomura, Santander, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and so on.
2 Empirical studies show that over a long period, the average bank incurs costs 20 to 25% higher than costs at
the most e¢ cient banks (DeYoung, 1997). Haslem et al. (1999) use data envelopment analysis to show that about
20% of the large US bank were ine¢ cient in 1992.
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would survive if they manage to conceal their type. They can do so by increasing the amount
of risk in order to deliver the same returns as the high e¢ cient banks. In equilibrium, the less
e¢ cient banks take too much risks.
Another set of strategies can be obtained if the regulator can set an upper limit on the amount of
risk that banks can take, but, to protect banksbusiness model, does not publicly disclose the bank
specic information. In general, regulators get information on bank risk exposure through on-site
and o¤-site examinations or sta¤members working within the banks. Their task is not an easy one
given limitations on disclosure and the underlying exposure in bankstrading books, particularly
when complex instruments are in question. After 2008, regulators carried out time-consuming
stress tests that measure a banks resilience to simulated additional macroeconomic shocks. In
May 2009, the US Federal Reserve System made public the methodology and results of these
tests for each of the nineteen large banks subject to these checks, while the European regulators
decided to keep the bank-specic information secret and disclose only aggregate information.3
So in the European context, the regulators information was private knowledge. Some prudential
ratios might also be communicated only to the regulator, without being publicly disclosed. If such
an upper bound on risk exists, and this limit is known by banks only (and the regulator), good
banks can signal themselves by increasing returns (and risk) up to the point where bad banks
cannot follow them. If not all good banks undertake the costly "super-signaling" strategy, then
bad banks can further survive by taking excessive amounts of risk.
This extended game presents several types of equilibria, depending on the proportion of good
banks and the gap in operating costs. The main contribution of the paper is to emphasize that,
under imperfect information, in any of these equilibria at least some banks have no other optimal
choice than to hold on their balance sheet more risk than in a perfect information set-up. Fur-
thermore, for some parameter values, we get a typical conguration of multiple equilibria; which
one of them actually materializes ultimately depends on investorsbeliefs. In a multiple equilibria
setting, the economic system is prone to extreme instability.
3 In June 2010, Spain decided to make public the results of stress tests performed on national banks. Despite
some protest on behalf of Germany, the other European leaders agreed on making public the stress tests carried
out by the Committee of European Bank Supervisors.
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Our simplied bank model does not allow to bring into the picture the capital-to-asset ratio, an
indicator traditionally used to assess a bank nancial health.4 After the crisis, policymakers took
signicant steps with the aim of capping the amount of risk that banks can take. One important
decision adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on September 12, 2010 was to
increase the minimum common equity requirement ratio to 7%, as compared to 2% before the
crisis (banks have time until 2019 to comply with this new target). We would notice that the
extensive literature on the relationship between capital requirements and risk taking is somehow
inconclusive; some authors have even suggested that higher capital bu¤ers may actually facilitate
higher risk-taking (Kahane, 1977; Koehn & Santomero, 1980; see also the survey by VanHoose,
2007). Since a high capital-to-assets ratio is both observable and involves an opportunity cost
for the bank, this indicator could also be used for signaling purposes. If weak banks can set
aside as much capital as strong banks (and take higher risks), then strong banks might be able
to signal themselves by rising the capital ratio well above the legal minimum, to the point where
weak banks cannot follow them. This alternative approach would provide an interesting path for
further research.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our main assumptions. Section
3 analyzes the equilibria of the game. Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 Main assumptions
The model is cast as a game between banksmanagers and shareholders under imperfect infor-
mation of the latter about the structure of the asset portfolio of the bank. The banking sector is
made up of publicly listed banks, that take deposits and issue debt in order to grant loans and
buy nancial assets. If the bank has access to a risk-free asset and to a portfolio of risky assets
and loans, the manager can pick any combination of risk/return along the capital market line, a
tangent to the e¢ cient frontier (Markowitz, 1952). A higher return can be obtained only if the
bank takes more risks (by investing more in the e¢ cient portfolio of risky assets and loans).
Denoting the net return by R and the amount of risk by v; this typical trade-o¤ between risk
4 Implicitly the model assumes that good and bad banks have the same capital and assets, and di¤er only in
operating costs.
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and return for a bank of type i can be written:
Ri(v) = R0 + v   ci; (1)
where R0 > 0 is the interest rate of the risk-free asset,  > 0 is the slope of the capital market
line and ci stands for the bank-specic operating cost.5 The inverse function, indicating the risk
needed to achieve a given return for a bank with operating cost ci is also of interest for further
developments:
vi(R) =  1

R R0 + ci

: (2)
We assume that, depending on the quality of their management, banks di¤er in their operating
costs.6 To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that banks can be of two types:
"good" banks (of type g) with a low operating cost cg that can be normalized to zero without
loss of generality and "bad" banks (of type b) with a high operating cost cb = c > 0: In Figure
1, we represent the capital market lines of such a good and bad bank. It can be noticed that in
order to provide shareholders with the same net return, bad banks must take riskier bets, that is
vb(R) > vg(R); 8R > R0.
Let q be the proportion of good banks in the total population of banks, 1   q being the
proportion of bad banks. This distribution of banks is common knowledge.
In a general form, we represent the utility of the representative risk-averse shareholders by a
quasiconcave function U(R; v); with @U(; )=@R > 0; @U(; )=@v < 0. Resulting indi¤erence curves
are convex.
Shareholders agree to pay the banks manager a compensation that is proportional to their per-
ceived utility, or W = E[U(R; v)]; where E[ ] is the expectations operator;7 the compensation
factor  is not essential, so we normalize it to 1.
Under these assumptions, in a perfect information set-up, a manager running a good bank
5 Financial literature focuses on return variance (denoted often by 2) as a proxy for risk. The risk considered
in this text is of the nature of an extreme event. The impact of such event on the rm cannot be directly inferred
from the observed return variance.
6 The structure of the problem and the solution would not change if, instead of di¤erent operating costs, we
assume that banks di¤er in their investment opportunities (thus, the Markovitz frontier would be broader for the
stronger bank, and the slope of its capital market line would be steeper than for the weaker bank).
7 These expectations will be determined over the set of beliefs about the type of bank given the return strategy.
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Figure 1: Return strategies, risk and utilities
would simply choose the bundle (RH ; vH) that maximizes his income given the banks capital
market line, such as indicated at point A in Figure 1.
Notice that the manager of a bad bank would prefer the bundle (RL; vL); at point B in the
same gure. Yet, given that shareholderssatisfaction is higher for good banks than for bad banks,
no investor would hold the bad bank stocks: therefore less e¢ cient banks cannot survive in this
perfect information world.
However, the assumption of perfect information is not very realistic given that a banks risk
exposure is a very complex commodity. As noticed in the Introduction, it is very di¢ cult for
outsiders, even for expert ones, to evaluate the full amount of risk taken by a bank. Building
on these basic fact, we further assume that the level of risk exposure of a given bank is private
information to its manager, while the stock return is public information. In this context the set
of strategies of the banks is more sophisticated:
 For bad banks, like in the perfect information set-up, the strategy of playing RL is never
optimal since it reveals the type of the bank and all the shareholders would leave it. At
di¤erence with the perfect information case, in the imperfect information environment a bad
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bank can survive if it manages to conceal its type. It can reach this outcome by increasing
the riskiness of its portfolio such as to deliver the return RH ; i.e. the perfect information
return of the good bank (at point Bin Figure 1).
 Good banks can play their perfect information optimal strategy RH as well. However, if
good banks want to make sure that no bad bank has an incentive to imitate them, they
should pay a su¢ ciently high return that a bad bank cannot deliver it. In order to analyze
the broadest set of equilibria, we consider that regulators can set an upper limit on the total
risk allowed to be taken by any bank, a limit denoted by v (the vertical line on Figure 1).
This upper limit on risk is known by banks. We assume that shareholders no not have the
same ability to measure risk as the regulator.8 Then, if a bank pays a return slightly above
RS , dened by:
RS = R0 + v   c; (3)
it unambiguously signals itself as a good bank, given that bad banks cannot further increase
risk such as to copy them. RS is thus the second return strategy of the good bank.
Turning now to the managers payo¤, we argued that if investors perceive that a bank is of the
bad type, this bank leaves the market and the compensation of the manager becomes zero. So,
a positive compensation for the manager can be dened only for banks that stay on the market
(i.e., those that are not been perceived as being bad banks). Denoting by Pr[ijRj ] the probability
shareholders assign to the event that a bank is of the type i; with i 2 fb; gg; if the return strategy
is Rj , with j 2 fL;H; Sg, the managers payo¤ can be written:
W (Rj) =
8>><>>:
0; if Pr[bjRj ] = 1
Pr[gjRj ]U(Rj ; vg(Rj)) + Pr[bjRj ]U(Rj ; vb(Rj)); if Pr[bjRj ] 2 [0; 1[
(4)
Notice that return strategiesRS andRL reveal perfectly a banks type. ThusW (RS) = U(RS ; vg(RS))
and W (RL) = 0.
Figure 2 presents the decision tree.
The typical sequence of decisions goes like this:
8 As mentioned in the Introduction, this situation is characteristic for instance of the European banking landscape
between June 2009 and June 2010.
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RS
RH
RH
q
1-q
Type g
Type b
a
1-a
RL
W(RS)=U(RS,v(RS))
W(RL)=0
W(RH)=E[U(RH,vi(RH))]
Manager’s payoff
Figure 2: Decision Tree
 At step 0, Nature picks the type of bank, either b or g:
 At step 1, depending on their type, banks chose their return strategy.
 At step 2, shareholders make their opinion about the type of bank given the observed returns
and pay the manager a compensation proportional to their own expected utility; the game
ends.
Finally, we notice that the gap between U(RS ; vg(RS)) and U(RH ; vb(RH)) depends on the op-
erating cost c: Figure 3 shows that there is a critical ~c such that U(RS ; vg(RS)) = U(RH ; vb(RH)):
Taking RH as given and using Eq. (2), we can show that the utility of the manipulating bad
bank is decreasing in c:
dU(RH ; vb(RH ; c))
dc
=
@U(RH ; vb(RH ; c))
@vb(RH ; c)
dvb(RH ; c)
dc
=  1Uv < 0: (5)
On the other hand, using Eq. (3) to determine dRS=dc =  1 and Eq. (2), to get dvg(RS)=dRS =
 1 we can show that the utility of the good bank that implements the signaling strategy is
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Figure 3: The critical operating cost ~c
increasing in c :
dU(RS(c); vg(RS(c)))
dc
=
@U()
@RS

dRS
dc

+
@U()
@vg
dvg(RS(c))
dRS(c)

dRS
dc

=
=  UR   Uv 1 =   1UR[  MRS(RS ; v(RS))]: (6)
Outside the optimum of the good bank, for RS > RH ; the marginal rate of substitution MRS =
 Uv=UR > ; thus the derivative has a positive sign.
Thus, for any c < ~c we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vb(RH)) and for c > ~c; we have
U(RS ; vg(RS(c))) > U(RH ; vb(RH ; c)). This latter case was depicted in Figure 1.
3 Equilibria
An equilibrium of this game is dened as a situation where banks strategies are optimal (i.e.,
allow to their CEO to earn the highest compensation) given shareholdersbeliefs about the type
of bank, and shareholdersbeliefs are correct given banksoptimal strategies. We may distinguish
between a separating equilibrium (where the return strategy of a bank perfectly reveals its type), a
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pooling equilibrium (where all banks implement the same strategy and thus no information about
the type of bank can be inferred from the observed return strategy), and a hybrid equilibrium
(where banks play a Nash mixed strategy and this strategy carries some but not full information
about their type).
In order to rule out a trivial situation, we admit that, by increasing risk enough, bad banks
can deliver the perfect information optimal return of the good bank, or, in an equivalent way, that
RS > RH :9 If bad banks cannot copy the strategy of the good banks, only the latter do survive
and implement the perfect information strategy RH :
3.1 Signaling equilibrium: good banks do RS
We can show that an elementary separating equilibrium where all good banks deliver their signaling
return RS and bad banks have left the market is always possible.
In such an equilibrium, good banks strategy is s(g) = RS : The equilibrium beliefs are:
Pr[gjRS ] = 1; and, given that any bank that pays less than RS should be a bad bank, Pr[gjRL] = 0
and Pr[gjRH ] = 0:
Bad banks can play either RL or RH ; but given the system of beliefs, the managers payo¤ is:
W
 
RL

=W
 
RH

= 0. There is no incentive for a bad bank to stay in the market. Furthermore,
RS is the optimal strategy for the good bank: indeed, the condition W
 
RS

> W
 
RH

= 0 is
always true.
In this equilibrium, the risk exposure of good banks exceeds the perfect information level,
vg(RS) > vg(RH): Good banks resort to excessive risk taking as a barrier to entry.
3.2 Pooling equilibrium: all banks do RH
We can now put forward the existence of a pooling equilibrium where all banks play RH : bad
banks play the perfect information optimal strategy of good banks, and good banks decide not to
signal themselves by doing RS : Bankssingle strategy is s(i) = RH ; 8i 2 fb; gg:
Shareholdersequilibrium beliefs can be written: Pr[gjRS ] = 1; Pr[gjRH ] = q and Pr[gjRL] = 0:
Necessary conditions for this equilibrium are: (1) W (RH) > W (RS) for the good bank and
9 In turn, this condition is met only if the operating cost is not too big, i.e. if c < R0 + v  RH :
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(2) W (RH) > W (RL) = 0 for the bad bank. Since W (RS) > 0; the equilibrium exists under
the single condition W (RH) > W (RS): Given the denition of the managers payo¤ (Eq. 4), this
condition becomes:
qU(RH ; vg(RH)) + (1  q)U(RH ; vb(RH)) > U(RS ; vg(RS)) (7)
or:
q > q1  U(R
S ; vg(RS))  U(RH ; vb(RH))
U(RH ; vg(RH))  U(RH ; vb(RH)) : (8)
In the small operating cost case (c < ~c), we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vb(RH)) that implies
q1 < 0: the previous condition is always true. The pooling equilibrium always exists if the loss of
utility of shareholders who support a bad bank is not too large; this can happen if the operating
cost gap c is small.
In the large operating cost case (c > ~c), we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) > U(RH ; vb(RH)); thus q1 > 0:
Furthermore, q1 < 1 as U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U(RH ; vg(RH)): We can conclude that in the large cost
case, the pooling equilibrium exists only if the frequency of good banks is large enough. If there
are not too many bad banks who imitate the good banks, the manager of the latter has not too
much to lose, and it does not worth for him to implement an expensive signaling strategy.
In the pooling equilibrium, bad banks take too much risks as compared to the perfect infor-
mation set-up, but they all survive in this environment.
3.3 Hybrid equilibrium: some good banks signal themselves, all others
play RH
In this equilibrium, a proportion  of the good banks decide to signal themselves by playing RS ;
and (1   ) play their perfect information strategy RH . All bad banks copy the latter and play
RH :
The mixed equilibrium strategy of the good banks is s(g) = fRS + (1   )RH j 2 [0; 1]g
and the bad banksstrategy is s(b) = RH : Using Bayes rule, and denoting by Pr[Rj ji] the prob-
ability that a bank of type i plays strategy Rj , equilibrium beliefs can be written: Pr[gjRL] = 0;
Pr[gjRS ] = 1 and:
Pr[gjRH ] = Pr[R
H jg] Pr[g]
Pr[RH ]
=
(1  )q
(1  )q + (1  q) : (9)
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In equilibrium, a good bank must be indi¤erent between strategies RH and RS :
W (RS) =W (RH), U(RS ; vg(RS)) = Pr[gjRH ]U  RH ; vg(RH)+ Pr[bjRH ]U  RH ; vb(RH) :
(10)
This equation allows us to determine (1  ) with respect to predetermined variables:
(1  ) = (1  q)
q

U(RS ; vg(RS))  U  RH ; vb(RH)
[U (RH ; vg(RH))  U(RS ; vg(RS))] : (11)
We rst notice that U
 
RH ; vg(RH)
  U(RS ; vg(RS)) > 0. Hence, in the small cost case (c < ~c),
since U(RS ; vg(RS)) < U
 
RH ; vb(RH)

we have (1 ) < 0 : the hybrid equilibrium is impossible.
In the large cost case (c > ~c); we have U(RS ; vg(RS)) > U(RH ; vb(RH)); so 1    > 0: The
equilibrium exists if 1   < 1; which is equivalent to:
q > q1 
U(RS ; vg(RS))  U  RH ; vb(RH)
U (RH ; vg(RH))  U (RH ; vb(RH)) : (12)
This is the same existence condition as that of the pooling equilibrium in the same large cost case
(Eq 8).
In the hybrid equilibrium, both bad banks and a fraction  of the good banks are taking an
excessive risk. The maximum amount of risk in the economy appears for  ! 1; we infer that if
the hybrid equilibrium is in place, the amount of risk in this economy reaches its highest level for
c& ~c.
3.4 A summary of possible equilibria
Table 1 presents a summary of the possible equilibria. Except for the case of large costs and
a small proportion of bad banks (q < q1), the game features a typical conguration of multiple
equilibria, where the equilibrium that will actually materialize depends on investorsbeliefs.
"Small" cost (c < ~c) "Large" cost (c > ~c)
"A few" bad banks: q < q1 Separating, Pooling Separating
"Many" bad banks: q > q1 Separating, Pooling Separating, Pooling, Hybrid
Table 1. Summary of possible equilibria
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This analysis was performed using general forms for shareholder utility functions. There is
no need to argue much about the modelling benet of general forms as compared with specic
forms. The reverse side of the coin is that in absence of explicit forms for our critical thresholds
q1 and ~c; it is not easy identify what type of equilibrium would describe the best the banking
sector situation in the eve of the crisis. If we consider the overall number of banks in the US and
Europe (more than 8000 in the US and about 7500 in Europe), the proportion of "bad" banks
can be seen as being small. However, if we limit our analysis to the "exclusive" segment of large,
multi-product banks with a global reach, then the proportion of banks that were deeply a¤ected
by the crisis turned out to be substantial. In general, di¤erences between these large banks in
terms of investment opportunities and operating costs are small. Our analysis does not allow to
say "how small is small" as compared to the critical cost ~c (for which we provide only an implicit
denition). Thus, on a pure theoretical ground it is impossible to rule out any of the equilibria,
including the hybrid one. In a conguration of multiple equilibria, which one actually materialize
depends on shareholders"sandy" expectations. In any case, the most important result from our
general analysis is that in any of the possible equilibria banks take too much risks as compared to
the perfect information case.
4 Conclusion
According to a broad expert consensus, an abnormal accumulation of risk by banks throughout
the world was at the origin of the 2007-2009 recession. The analysis in this paper connects this
race for risk to the imperfect information in the banking sector. In a world where returns can be
observed but risk cannot, banks running with high operating costs would take more risk only to
deliver higher returns and be perceived as highly e¢ cient banks. The latter can signal themselves
by further increasing risks well above their perfect information optimal level.
Our analysis was built on a very simple model of bank. The representative bank has been
represented as a portfolio manager able to arbitrate between risk and return. Such a simplied
approach does not allow to address the important role played by bank capital as a bu¤er for
adverse shocks or for signaling purposes. This was the price to pay for a transparent analysis of
13
the various signaling strategies.
The game presents several equilibria, all being characterized by excessive accumulation of
risk by banks compared to the ideal, perfect information case. Furthermore, depending on the
proportion of less e¢ cient banks and the di¤erential in operating costs, the model presents several
multiple equilibria congurations, an economic environment prone to instability.
Policy implications are straightforward. Any reform able to reduce the asymmetry of informa-
tion between banksmanagers and shareholders should eliminate a key reason of the race for risk.
Yet there is no miracle solution able to achieve this result spontaneously. If bankstrue exposure
to risk is hard to assess by outsiders and at least some good banks implement their high-risk
signaling strategy, then stronger regulation is needed to cap the maximum amount of risk that
banks can take. Yet, from a theoretical perspective, what regulation would allow to reach this
target is not a settled issue. As already mentioned, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
decided on September 12, 2010 to gradually rise the minimum requirement for common equity,
from 2% before the crisis, to 7% by 2019. It still has to be seen whether such a measures goes in
the right direction.
References
Berger, A. N. and DeYoung R., (1997). Problem loans and cost e¢ ciency in commercial
banks, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, pp. 849870.
Borio, C., (2008). The nancial turmoil of the 2007-?: A preliminary assessment and some
policy considerations, BIS Working Paper 251.
Brunnermeier, M. M., (2009). Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-2008, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 23, 1, pp. 77100.
Boot, A. and Marinc, M., (2006). Competition and entry in banking: Implications for sta-
bility and capital regulation, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2006-015/2, January
22.
DeYoung, Robert, (1997). X-e¢ ciency and management quality in national banks, Journal
of Financial Services Research, 13, 1, pp. 522.
Diamond, D. W. and Raghumaram G. R., (2009). The credit crisis: Conjectures about causes
and remedies, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 99, 2, 606610.
Haslem, J. A., Scheraga C. A. and Bedingeld, J. P., (1999). DEA e¢ ciency proles of
US banks operating internationally, International Review of Economics and Finance, 8, pp.
165182.
14
IMF, (2010). World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC,
April.
Kahane, Y., (1977). Capital adequacy and the regulation of nancial intermediaries, Journal
of Banking and Finance, 1, pp. 207218.
Koehn, M. and Santomero A., (1980). Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk, Journal
of Finance, 35, pp. 12351233.
Markowitz, H. M., (1952). Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance, 7, pp. 7791.
Morgan, D. P., (2002). Risk and uncertainty in an opaque industry, American Economic
Review, 92, 4, pp. 874888.
Pomfret, R., (2010). The nancial sector and the future of capitalism, Economic Systems,
34, pp. 2237.
Spence, M., (1973). Job market signaling, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 3, pp. 355
374.
Spence, M., (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets, Nobel
Prize Lecture, American Economic Review, 92, 3, pp. 434459.
Stiglitz, J. E., (2010). Freefall. Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy, Allen
Lane, UK.
Riley, J. G., (1975). Competitive signalling. Journal of Economic Theory, 10, pp. 174186.
Trichet, J-C., (2008). Réexions sur les turbulences nancières, Intervention auprès de
lInstitut Montaigne le 23/12/2008, Paris.
VanHoose, D., (2007). Theories of bank behavior under capital regulation, Journal of Bank-
ing and Finance, 31, pp. 36803697.
15
